

Lesson Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Lesson ID: 50753-24977

Title: ADEQUACY OF MPF TRAINING (BASED ON RESTORE HOPE EXPERIENCES)

Operation/Exercise Name: RESTORE HOPE

Observed: 28 Apr 1993

Originator: MCCDC CALLP TM

POC: MCCDC WDID(C391) Commercial: (703)640-4914 DSN: 2784913

5. (U) OBSERVATION:

MPF training is inadequate. Of the three deployment capabilities, only air contingency forces (ACF) and amphibious movement are typically considered as operational capabilities.

6. (U) DISCUSSION:

On the other hand, use of the MPF is thought of as a logistical evolution. This is incorrect, and results in the reinvention of the MPF wheel for nearly every exercise and operation.

Minimal tie between logistics and operations

In Operation RESTORE HOPE (RH), the MPS had just begun offloading when the decision to greatly extend ground operations was made.

Thorough planning of desired force capabilities, developing the supporting FIE, and integrating the MPF with the other capabilities must be accomplished.

MPF responsibilities are assigned within the G-4 at I MEF and this leads to minimal ties to the operational arm of the organization, the G-3.

Shortfalls in LFTCPAC training

The training teams provided by LFTCPAC are essential to enhancing MPF knowledge. Currently however, the level of detail provided by the LFTCPAC team is considered by many within I MEF to be too generic. Compounding the program's lack of detail is the apparent inability to get hands on observation of MPF operations.

I MEF leaders noted that on at least two occasions an invitation

to LFTCPAC was provided, but rejected due to a lack of time, manpower, or funding. The result is training based primarily on manuals and little on actual experience.

Seeking new training opportunities

Opportune training during limited maintenance operations at Diego Garcia, during the MMC, or during a CAX also have great potential. I MEF had scheduled these opportunities but, because of RH, was unable to test them.

I MEF is being proactive in developing MPF training opportunities, and observation of these opportunities should provide good data regarding the cost/benefit of such initiatives.

#### 7. () LESSON LEARNED:

#### 8. (%) RECOMMENDED ACTION:

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7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: None

8. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) Develop opportunities to educate senior leaders regarding the integration of the three Marine Corps capabilities; amphibious, air contingency, and maritime prepositioning.

2) Require observation or participation in actual MPF planning and execution as a requirement for MPF instructor preparation.

3) Direct the Training and Education Syndicate of the PPMG to study the feasibility of expanding the current CAX to support an MPFCAX.

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9. (U) COMMENTS:

None

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